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[L. A. No. 25234.

In Bank. July 26,1960.]

STAR-KIST FOODS, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, v.
JOHN R. QUINN, as County Tax Assessor, etc., et aI.,
Appellants.

/\
~---)

[1] Taxation-Remedies of Taxpayers-Conditions of Relief.Ordinarily, a taxpayer seeking" relief from an erroneous assel'sment must exhaust available administrative remedies before
resorting to the courts. Prior application to the local board of
equalization is not required, however, in certain cases where the
facts are undisputed and the property assessed is tax-exempt,
outside the jurisdiction or nonexistent.
[2] ld.-Remedies of Taxpayer-Grounds for Relief.-While ill
one sense almost any mistake which results in nn excessive
assessment amounts to nn overvaluation of the property of a
taxpayer, there is a real and distinct difference between those
cases in which it Dlay properly be said that the error is one
of overvaluation and those in which the overvaluation is a

[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Taxation, § 268; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 1161
et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-4,6] Taxation, § 265; [5] Malldulllu~,
§ 15.
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Ill('rc incidental result of an erroneous ass('ssment of property
whil'h should not havc been assessed.
ld.-Remedies of Taxpayer-Conditions of Relief.-The nec('ssity of a taxpayer's recourse to the local board of equalization'
bcfore seeking judicial relief is properly d('termined by the
nature of the issues in dispute, not by whether nn assessment
is attacked in part or in tnto.
ld.-Remedies of Taxpayer-Conditions of Relief.-Where the
only substantive issue involved is whether Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 107.1, dealing with taxation of possessory interests arising
out of a lease of exempt property, is unconstitutional on it~
face, there is no question of valuation that the local board of
equalization has special competence to decide, and a taxpayer's
rccourse to such board i~ not required before seeking a judicial
determination of the constitutionality of § 107.1. The taxpayer
could, however, obtain relief by paying under protest and
suing fOl' recovery (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 5136 et scq.), and in
such an action any question of valuation pursuant to § 107.1
would be determined by remand to the board of equalization.
Mandamus-Existence of Other Remedy.-~Iandamus is ordinarily denied when petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.)
Taxation-Remedies of Taxpayer-Mandamus.-The fact that
a taxpayer filed its petition for mandate before the alleged
erroneous assessment was complete does not affect the adequacy
of its remedy by payment of taxes under protest and suit for
recovery thereof.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Joseph M. Maltby, Judge. Reversed.
Proceeding in mandamus to compel county tax assessor to
cancel tax assessments and reassess petitioner's leasehold
interests in accordance with Rev. & Tax. Code, § 107.1. Judgment granting writ, reversed.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Alfred Charles
DeFlon and Carroll H. Smith, Deputy County Counsel for
Appellants.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, James E. Sabine and Dall
Kaufmann, Assistant Attorneys General, and Ernest P. Goodman, Deputy Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Appellants.
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Mandamus, § 18; Am.Jur., Mandamus, §§ 42,
52.1.
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Real & Heal, M. L. Heal and Bruce 1. Hochman for Hespondent.
J. Kerwin Rooney, Port Attorney, Port of Oakland, Robert
G. Cockins, City Attorney (Santa MOllica), O'~lelveny &
Myers, George l<". Elmendorf, Bennett 'Y. Priest, Lillit'k,
Geary, McHose, Roethke & Myers, John C. McHose, Holbrook,
Tarr & 0 'Neill, 'Y. Sumner HoI brook, .J r., Francis II. 0 'N ciU,
John F. O'Hara, Horton & Foote, Joseph K. Horton, Ralph D.
Sweeney, Luce, Forward, Kunzel & Scripps, Luce, Forward,
Hamilton & Scripps, Fred Kunzel, James C. Hewitt, Howard
H. Taylor, Oakes & Horton and Robert A. Oakes as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J.-Star-Kist Foods, Inc., leases certain land
and improvements owned by the city of Los Angeles and
located within its boundaries. Its leases were made before
our decision in De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego,
45 Ca1.2d 546 l~90 P.2d 544], became final and were not extended or renewed thereafter. Section 107.1 of the Hevenue
and Taxation Code provides that such leasehold interests
should be evaluated for purposes of taxation at an amount
equal to the excf.'SS, if any, of the value of the interest, as
determined by the formula contained in the De Luz opinion,
over the present worth of the rentals to become due under the
lease during its unexpired term. The assessor of Los Angeles
County, however, assessed Star-Kist's leasehold interests without deducting the present worth of rentals for the unexpired
terms, on the ground that section 107.1 is void because inconsistent with section 1 of article XIII and section 12 of article
XI of the California Constitution.
In Forster Shipb1tilding Co. v. C01tnty of Los Angeles, anie,
p. 450 [6 Cal.Rptr. 24, 353 P.2d 736], we held that the
last four paragraphs of section 107.1 are valid and that
the assessor should have deducted the present worth of rentals
for the unexpired terms of the leases. Unlike plaintiffs in the
Forster case, however, Star-Kist did not apply to the Los
Angeles County Board of Equalization for correction of the
erroneous assessments, Lut sought and obtained a writ of mandate commanding the assessor to cancel those assessments and
to reasscss Star-Kist's leasehold interests in accordance with
section 107.1.
Defendants contend that Star-Kist's failure to apply to tll\'
local board of equalization precludes judicial relief. [1] Ordi-

)

510

STAR-KIST FOODS,

lxC'.

I'. QUlXX

[54 C.2<1

uarily a taxpayer sceking relief from an errOilt'OUS assessmen~
must exhaust available administrative remedies before rcsorting to the courts. (City to COl/llty of San Francisco v.
COl/llty of San Mateo, 36 CaL2d 196, 201 [222 P.2d 860] ;
ScCII rity-Fil'st

NatiollQ.1 Ba1lk v. COllllty of Los A.ngeles, 35

Ca1.2d 319,320-321 [217 1'.2d 946] ; Dawson y. County of Los
Angelcs, 15 Ca1.2d 7i, 81 [flb P.2d 495] ; Lucc v. City of San
Diego, 198 Cal. 405, 406 [245 P. 196].) Prior application to
the local board of equalization has not been required, however, in certain cases where the facts were undisputed and
the property assessed was tax-exempt (Bre:lJ1er v. City of
Los Angeles, 160 Cal. 72, 79-80 [116 P. 397] ; Parrott (0 Co.
v. City &; 'County of San Francisco, 131 Cal.App.2d 332, 342
[280 P.2d 881]), outside the jurisdiction (see Kern River Co.
v. County of Los Angeles, 164 Cal. 751,755-756 [130 P. 714]),
or nonexistent (see Pacific Coast Co. v. Wells, 134 Cal. 471,
473 [66 P. 657]; Associated Oil Co. v. COllnty of Orangc,
4 Cal.App.2d 5, 9, 11 [40 P.2d 887]).
In the present case petitioner does not cOllt('nd that its
leasehold interests should be free of tax, but attacks only the
assessor's failure to deduct rental values as prescribed by
section 107.1. Defendants contend that any such attack upon
an assessment in part rather than ·in toto raises an issue of
"overvaluation" that must be presented initially to the local
board. Several cases support defendants' contention. (City
&; County of San Francisco v. County of San JIateo, 36 Ca1.2d
196, 201 [222 P.2d 860] ; SOl/thmt California J[ardwood etc.
Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal.App. 712, 714, 716
[194 P. 62] ; see Los Angeles etc. Co. v. COllnty of Los Angcles,
162 Cal: 164, 171 [121 P. 384, 9 A.L.R. 12i7].) [2] In
Parr-Richmond Industrial Corp. v. Boyd, 43 Ca1.2d 157, 165
[272 P.2d 16], however, we said: " 'While ill one sense it is
true that almost any mistake which results in an excessive
assessment amounts to an overvaluation of the property of a
taxpayer, we think there is a real and distinC't difference
behveen those eases in whieh it may properly be said that
the error is one of overvaluation and those cases in which
the overvaluation is a mere incidental rl'sult of an erroneous
assessmC'nt of property which should not have bC'en assessed.' "
[3] The necessity of recourse to the boardi!=l properly determined by thc lIatnre of the is~m"s in dif'pnte. and not b~'
whether an aSSL'ssmcnt is attaeked in part or ill toto. (Par/,Richmond Industrial CrJ1'p. v. BrJ!.ld, 43 Ca1.2,1 ]57. 165 [2fl2
P.2d 16] ; Brcnne1' v. City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. 72, 71;
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[IlG P. :1!)71; .I,w)ciafrrl Oi" CO. Y. C'wIII!! nf Omllge. 4 Cal.
:-., ] 1 [40 1'.~u 887J; Sl'C Los .1 noeles etc, Corp. '-.
COllllty 0.; IllS .lllr:"les, 22 CaI.App.2(1-!1S, 422 [71 P.2d 282].)
[4] The only snhstantiyc issue in the prescnt case is
whether sPc'tion 107.1 is UllCollstitutional on its facc. As in
rasps illYoh-ing ollly .11<, qurstion whether property is taxable,
there is no questioll of \'aluatioll that the local board of equalizatioll had special competelll'e to de<:ide. There is 110 dispute
as to the facts and no possibility that action by the hoard might
ayoid the necessity of deciding" the constitut iOllal issue or
modify its nature. (Cf. Security-First National Bank v.
COllnty of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 31a, 322 [217 1'.2<1946].)
Under the circumstances, therefore, recourse to the local board
of cqualization was not required before scrkillg a judicial determination of the constitutionality of section 107.1.
Star-Kist, howe\'cr, could have obtainl'(l relief by paying'
its taxes under protest and suing for recovery thereof (Ht'\'.
& Tax Code, § 5136 ~tseq.), and in such an action any (~ne,,
tion or valuation pursuant to section 107.1 ",o~lld bl' (It'te]'mined by remand to the board or equalization. (S,'I' PI)/'::I( I'
Shipbuilding Co. v. County of Los Angeles, ante, pp. 450, 460
[6 Cal.Rptr. 24, 353 P.2d 736].) [5] )1<1I1<1ate is o\'(linill'il.\"
denied when the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and lHleqllatt'
remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Phelan v. SUjJcrio)'
COlll't, 35 Cal.2d 363, 366 [217 P.2d 951] ; see Code Civ. Pro' ..
§ 1086.) In a number of older cases ('ourts issued man<latc to
set aside invalid asscssmcnts without considering th€ adequaC';of remedies to recover taxes paid. (State Land Settlement
Board Y. Henderson, 197 Cal. 470 [241 P. 560] ; Glenn-Colusa
Trr. Dist v. Oh1't, 31 Cal.App.2d 619 [88 P.2d 763] ; Pcoplc v.
Board of S1(pr:rt'isol'.~, 126 Cal.App. 670 [15 P.2d 209] ; see
Andel'soH-Coftonu;oocZ Irr. Di.st. v. IlllIl.-kCl't, 13 Cal.2d 191
[88 P.2d 685).) In more recent ease~, however, the adequacy
of such remedies has been considered and mandate has been
denied. (Security-First National Bank v. Board of Supervisors, 3:i Cal.2d 323, 327 [217 P.2d 9481; Vista hr. Dist. ".
Board of Supervisors, 32 Cal.2d 477, 478 [196 P.2d 926] ;
Sherman Y. (/uinn, 31 Ca1.2d 661, 66;) []!)2 P.2d 17].)
Star-Kist attelllPts to distinguish SI'Clll'it11-Pil'st National
Bank v. Board of Supervisors, supra, and Vista b·r. Dist. v.
Board of SU[)(},L'isors, supra, on the gTOlllld that the pditioJlers in those case's sought mandate after the assessments We'J'(~
complete. [6] The faet that Star-K ist filed its petitio~l

..\p[l.~(l
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for mandate before the assrssment was complete, ho;vevrr,
dors not affect the adrquaey of its remedy by payment of
taxrs under protest and suit for recovery thereof. (See Sherman v. Qninll, 31 Ca1.2d 661, 66;) [102 P.2d 17].)
Star-Kist contends that we should disregard Sherman v.
Qu inn, sllpra, as being irreconcilablc with Lockhart v. lVolden,
17 Ca1.2d 628 [111 P.2d 319], and Eisley v. Mohall, 31 Ca1.2d
637 [192 P.2d 5]. In Lockhart v. Wolden mandate was issued
to compel the assessor to allow petitioner an exemption as a
veteran. The remedy by payment of tax and suit to recover
was held inadequate, inter alia, because at that time a plaintiff
who recovered wrongfully collected taxes could not recover
interest for the period prior to judgment. (17 Ca1.2d at 633.)
He can now recover such interest (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 5141),
and arguments based on Lockhart v. lVoldcn were rejected in
Sherman v. Quinn. In Eisley v. Mohan mandate was denied
because the challenged assessments were not erroneous, and
the adequacy of the rrmedy by payment of taxes under protest
and suit to recover was not discussed. Star-Kist contends that
the remedy was impliedly held inadequate since otherwise
the court would not have reached the merits of the controversy.
No such implication can be made, however, because Eisley v.
Mohan was decided on the same day as Sherman v. Quinn,
which expressly held a comparable remedy to be adequate.
Star-Kist's reliance on San Diego etc. Ry. v. State Board of
Equalization, 165 Cal. 560 [132 P. 1044], is misplaced. In
that case mandamus issued to compel action by the state board
to preclude local taxation of the petitioner's assets. The writ
was timely to prevent the collection of local taxes and its denial
would have compelled the petitioner to sue for recovery of
taxes from a number of local taxing authorities. No such circumstances have been shown in the present case.
The judgment granting a peremptory writ of mandate is
reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J.,
and Dooling, J., concurred.
Hespondent's petition for a rehearing was denied August
24, 1960. Schauer, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.

